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Abstract  
This paper evaluates the determinants of quality - cost relationship in primary 
health care. We first summarize information from various indicators of care by 
principal component analysis (PCA), effectively producing quality of care 
indicators: accessibility, coverage and allocative efficiency. We then regress the 
costs of care against these indicators to evaluate their relationship. Our results 
suggest that PCA may be used to produce quality of care indicators. Furthermore, 
the relationship between the costs and quality of care is complex. Better 
accessibility is reflected in higher costs, whereas the efficient allocation of 
resources will bring some cost savings. 
Key words: Quality of care, principal component analysis 
JEL classification numbers: C38, H40, H51 
Tiivistelmä  
Tässä tutkimuksessa arvioidaan laadun ja kustannusten välistä yhteyttä 
perusterveydenhuollossa. Useiden perusterveydenhuollon mittareiden sisältämä 
informaatio tiivistetään ensimmäisessä vaiheessa pääkomponenttianalyysillä 
kolmeksi laatua mittaavaksi indikaattoriksi: saatavuudeksi, kattavuudeksi ja 
palveluiden allokatiiviseksi tehokkuudeksi. Toisessa vaiheessa 
perusterveydenhuollon yksikkökustannuksia selitetään pääkomponenttianalyysin 
tuottamilla indikaattoreilla ja arvioidaan, millainen yhteys kustannusten ja laadun 
eri ulottuvuuksien välillä on. Tutkimuksen tulokset osoittavat, että 
pääkomponenttianalyysiä voidaan käyttää rakentamaan laatuindikaattoreita. 
Lisäksi havaitaan, että kustannusten ja laadun välinen yhteys on monimutkainen. 
Parempi saatavuus on yhteydessä korkeampiin yksikkökustannuksiin, mutta 
palvelujen tehokkaampi kohdentaminen voi toisaalta tuottaa kustannussäästöjä. 
Asiasanat: Terveydenhuollon laatu, pääkomponenttianalyysi 
JEL-luokittelu: C38, H40, H51 
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1 Introduction
The main task of a public health care system is to maintain and yield health
among the citizens. However, government budgets are tight and the increase
in health care expenses together with aging does not help to consolidate the
budgets.1 Decision makers may be able to minimize the increase in health
care expenses by allocating resources efficiently.2 However, policies are not
alike: some cost-saving policies may harm the quality of care, while other
policies may leave quality intact. To evaluate the influence of cost-savings on
quality, one needs first a measurement of quality, and second, the relationship
between costs and quality should be verified.
Most health economic research focusing on quality-cost issues has con-
centrated on fragments of health care (e.g. cardiac diseases, diabetes treat-
ments), whereas given the weak economic prospects of governments, one
should rather study the possibility of revealing a link between quality and
costs at the system level. In this paper, we attempt to measure the quality of
care at the system level. We also evaluate whether costs are systematically
associated with quality. Finnish data from primary health care facilitate the
contemplation of these issues empirically.
A review of the literature reveals several definitions of the quality of care
(e.g. Lohr, 1990; Donabedian, 1988; Campbell et al., 2000).3 However,
some of these definitions, while explicit, are not easily operationalized in
practice. For this reason, we rely on a survey by Campbell et al. (2000),
which concluded that attributes such as accessibility, effectiveness, efficiency
1For discussion see Leibfritz et al. (1995), Seshamani and Gray (2004) and Stearns and
Norton (2004).
2Chassin and Galvin (1998) suggested that improving quality by fixing overuse or
misuse problems allows simultaneous cost decreases.
3For example, Donabedian (1988) proposed a system-based, three-pillar framework,
where one should distinguish between the structure of a health care system (structure),
the actual care given (process) and the effects of care on the health status (outcomes). For
studies that aim to evaluate the quality of care at the patient level or as disease-outcome
pairs, see Wray et al. (1995), Sloan et al. (2001) and Valentine et al. (2008). For studies
aiming to reduce multidimensional quality to a unidimensional construct of latent quality,
see Casparie et al. (1997) and Lee et al. (2000).
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and equity are the main dimensions of quality of care. In particular, they
suggested that at the societal level the quality of care is the ability to access
effective care on an efficient and equitable basis in order to optimize health
benefits for the whole population.
However, measuring unobserved quality is not without problems. Free-
man (2002) named several technical problems with indicator selection that
a researcher must overcome: the availability, validity and reliability of data;
confounding factors; and problems with robustness, sensitivity and speci-
ficity. According to McClellan and Staiger (1999, 2000), the main limitation
of quality indicators concerns their imprecise measurement, i.e. indicators
are likely to incorporate a substantial amount of noise, or the outcomes may
be influenced by factors unrelated to the quality of care. Furthermore, the
multidimensionality of quality requires a set of indicators to be used to build
a single quality indicator. Therefore, since quality measurement is tedious,
most of the literature assumes that quality is exogenous and not correlated
with costs or the output. However, as demonstrated by Braeutigam and
Pauly (1986) and Gertler and Waldman (1992), the cost functions exhibit
severe biases if they are not adjusted for endogenous quality.
Concluding from these studies, we hypothesize that the quality of care
may be multidimensional in its attributes, whereby a wide set of macro
indicators are explored to reveal its dimensions. Since such an approach is
likely to result in the indicator failures discussed by previous authors, we
make use of a method that is relatively robust to these failures.
In this paper, we utilize a novel method to examine the quality of care
by exploiting principal component analysis (PCA) in order to summarize
information from various health and health–related indicators. The great
variety of measures, all carrying information on the quality of primary health
care, enables the use of PCA to explore which indicators best explain the
variation in the interpreted quality components. We draw from previous
studies in interpreting the indicators in terms of the dimensions of quality
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and then compare our estimated dimensions with production costs to identify
the relationship between quality and costs.4
To address these aims, we use national panel data from more than 300
Finnish municipalities over several years. The main benefit in using these
data is that Finnish administrative data allow us to respond to the criticism
and concerns raised by previous authors (e.g. McClellan and Staiger 1999,
2000; Freeman, 2002 ). Firstly, Finnish data incorporate numerous measures
of the health status of the citizens and health care resources as indicators
facilitating the measurement of quality. Secondly, with municipal–level data
we can make use of socio-economic factors (e.g. demographics) to control
for their influence on the outcomes, i.e. we can control for confounding
factors by introducing risk-adjusting indicators. To validate our findings, we
perform robustness checks. This study yields a tractable way to search for
indicators whose establishment, use, and monitoring can be very helpful in
intensifying and steering the public health care system.
The main contribution of this study is assessing the problem of measuring
quality. Our results suggest that our indicator data, summarized by four
principal components, incorporate three dimensions of the quality of care,
namely (equal) accessibility, coverage and allocative efficiency, together with
a risk-adjusting component. These findings depart from those of McClellan
and Staiger (1999, 2000), since constructing only one quality indicator might
not be enough at the system level. Making use of the interpretation for the
set of indicators with quality content, an important finding in this study
is that the accessibility dimension of the quality of care is the main factor
explaining the observed variation between municipalities.
Moreover, after using the estimated quality of care indicators as outcomes
in a cost function, we find that costs are related to the quality of care in a
4We are familiar with the fact that one can derive other interpretations for our esti-
mated quality indicators, for instance, in the context of demand and supply. However, we
believe these differences are mainly nuances and do not alter the results concerning the
cost estimation.
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rather complex manner. On the one hand, we find that better accessibility
is reflected in higher costs. On the other hand, allocative efficiency is nega-
tively related to the costs of care, although there is little variation between
municipalities in this dimension. Here, our results verify those of Gertler and
Waldman (1992) in that if the dimensions attributed to quality of care were
not controlled for, the cost efficiency of health sector would be erroneously
measured, making the results concerning the (in-) efficiency biased.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 defines the quality of care
and its indicators, while the methods are reviewed in section 3. Section 4
presents the results from principal component analysis and cost efficiency
evaluation, and section 5 discusses the merits of these findings.
2 Quality of care indicators
By definition, quality is a latent variable that is not directly observed but is
manifested in a number of observable indicators. We thus collect information
on a number of indicators related to health care services and study them
with principal component analysis to determine what part of the variation
in the data is due to indicators that can be interpreted as having a quality
component. Further, we hypothesize that at the system (population) level
the quality of care is multidimensional, and these dimensions can be named
as accessibility, allocative efficiency and coverage. However, it is not clear
from the outset which one dominates or whether all these dimensions are
present in our data.
As care for the whole population may conflict with care for individual
patients, we emphasize the system (population) level in describing quality
and in the choice of indicators. Equal accessibility corresponds to different
sub-populations and users all being served, whereby it is one measure of hor-
izontal equity (age & disease pair). Coverage corresponds to citizens across
the country all being served, i.e., this quality indicator measures horizon-
4
tal equity in the spatial dimension. However, there is no reason why equal
accessibility and coverage might not be merged into one dimension, which
remains to be tested in our empirical analysis. Allocative efficiency corre-
sponds to the existence of a tendency for vertical equity so that those with
greater need also have better access to care.5 Yet, as suggested by Chassin
and Galvin (1998), efficiency also means that there is no misuse, overuse or
underuse of care - irrespective whether it is measured across a country or
sub-populations. If a municipality focuses on procedures whereby institu-
tional care is substituted by less intensive care, such as informal care, one
can name the last component not just as efficiency but allocative efficiency,
since resources are targeted (prioritized) at those with a greater need.
To assess quality, we here use annual health indicator data mainly on
primary health care from 342 Finnish municipalities for time span from 2000
to 2006/2009.6 The data are available at national database SOTKAnet
(SOTKAnet, 2011), except for data on wages and on the price index for pub-
lic expenditure, which are available from the registries of Statistics Finland
(Statistics Finland 2011a). Two sets of exclusions took place. The Åland
Islands was excluded, since the inhabitants use both Finnish and Swedish
health care systems, making the Finnish registry data unreliable with respect
to the population. Also, municipalities in the Kainuu region were excluded,
since they co-operate in public health care provision, causing the municipal-
ity level data filed in the registry to be unreliable. After exclusions, we are
left with 318 spatially independent observations (municipalities). Moreover,
since data on inputs are only available up to 2006, models including these
indicators are estimated from 2000 to 2006.
We have 51 indicators in total, of which 27 indicators can be interpreted
to measure the health outcomes or demand for health care, 13 to measure
5Campbell et al. (2000) divided equity of care to horizontal equity (equal accessibility
to effective care for all users) and vertical equity (greater access to effective care for those
with more need).
6We focus on primary health care, since specialized health care is organized in larger
joint municipal boards (e.g. central hospitals).
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resources and inputs and the remaining 11 to describe the socio-economic
and demographic conditions of a municipality as controls for possible het-
erogeneity and confounding factors. To take into account the differences
in demographics across Finland, we also make use of a number of age and
sex standardized indicators, while for convenience most of the indicators are
measured in per capita terms. We further group the indicators according
to their relationship with the quality of care into four broad categories that
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. We assume that control variables are
not related to the quality of care per se, although they might influence the
demand of care or resources available for care.
At the system level, very few indicators exist that are interpretable as
reflecting the quality of care directly as an outcome of the care (e.g. mortal-
ity), as a measure of the service portfolio (e.g. service housing with 24-hour
assistance for the elderly) or as an indicator for opting out from public care
due to quality deficiencies (e.g. reimbursement for visits to private physi-
cians). Most of the indicators are indirect quality indicators, which are
further grouped into accessibility and coverage. The indicators that fall in
the accessibility group typically indicate the availability of care (e.g. hos-
pital care, patients per 1000 inhabitants). All resource indicators, such as
the number of practical nurses in primary health care, fall in the category
measuring coverage. The last category reflects risk adjustment (and the case
mix), such as diseases related to substance abuse or the unemployment rate.
The remaining control variables are relatively loosely tied to the quality of
care and are best described as controls for the budget (e.g. loans) or age
structure (e.g. population aged 15-64) and other demographics.
One novelty in our approach comes from the use of entitlement data,
whereby we further scrutinize these indicators. Entitlement indicators ex-
ist for different age and disease groups, although for younger cohorts some
diseases are rare and only the aggregates can be used.7 According to the
7These indicators come from the Social Insurance Institution of Finland (Kela), which
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Social Insurance Institution of Finland, the entitlement to special refunds
on medicines means that the person in question has some serious or long–
term illness requiring medication (e.g. coronary heart disease or diabetes)
(Kela, 2012). Each illness has its own criteria upon which entitlement is
granted, and the application always requires a statement from a specialist.
However, since the entitlement funding comes from the central government
body and not from the municipal budget, neither general practitioners nor
specialists have an incentive to withhold patients from such status. Since
the criteria for the entitlement to special refunds on medicines are strict, yet
transparent, these indicators give us a homogeneous grouping of diseases.
Therefore, the entitlement indicators enable us to truly compare like with
like in terms of the prevalence and complexity of illness (the case mix). This
merits the interpretation of entitlements as a homogeneous grouping, i.e.
quality–adjusted output, containing information on accessibility.
To evaluate the relationship between costs and quality, the data include
the costs of care measured as the net expenditure on primary health care,
including dental care. According to Statistics Finland, net expenditure is
obtained by subtracting the operating income from operating costs (Statistics
Finland, 2011a). The health status indicator (i.e. morbidity index) created
by the Social Insurance Institution of Finland provides a benchmark for
our quality indicators to facilitate the comparison and discussion.8 All 51
variables used to estimate the static factor together with the data on costs,
wages and morbidity are specified in Appendix A.
is responsible for providing social security benefits for the residents of Finland.
8According to the definition given by the Social Insurance Institution of Finland, the
morbidity index is based on three register variables: mortality, the proportion of disability
pension recipients in the working-age population and the proportion of people entitled to
special refunds on medicines in the total population.
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3 Methods
Our analyses proceed as follows. The first question we address is how to
capture the quality of health care from a set of indirect indicators. While
the direct measurement of the system-level quality is unfeasible due to the
lack of specific indicators, there are ways to assess quality indirectly from a
set of different indicators that can be defined as having quality components.
Then, having defined the dimensions of the quality of care, we assess their
relationship with the costs in a fixed effects model.
Our methodological response to the concerns raised in the literature
builds on the tradition of factor analysis, and a principal component analy-
sis (PCA) in particular.9 PCA aims to reduce the dimensionality of a data
set consisting of a large number of interrelated variables, while retaining as
much as possible of the variation present in the data (Jolliffe, 2002). The
principal components methodology is applied to the variance structure of
the indicator variables, and is ideal for descriptive purposes. The virtue of
PCA is that while some of the indicators are weakly linked to quality of care
or imprecisely measured, the method will limit the influence of noise on the
outcomes.
We closely follow McClellan and Staiger (1999, 2000) in interpreting our
approach, although we depart in one key aspect. While we also take a bunch
of data and filter the noise from it, the outcome of our procedure is from one
to three new variables that represent different dimensions of the quality of
care. That is, while previous research has tried to summarize the information
into one indicator, we believe the multidimensionality of quality might be
manifested in more than one principal component, as explained in section 2.
Formally, the approach will have the following preliminaries and set-up.
9Principal component analysis is often presented as a special case of factor analysis,
since the PCs can be used to estimate the factors. For discussion see Jolliffe (2002),
Chapter 7.
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Principal component analysis
Assume we have a (p × 1) random vector of observed indicators X, with
mean µ and covariance matrix Σ , each indicator related to the non-observed
quality of care η as in the classical measurement error model X = βη + 
where  is the measurement error. The idea is that each observed indicator
contains information on the quality of care and some noise. Now, since this
quality may have more than one dimension, the relationship between the
indicators and the quality is X = β1η1 + β2η2 + ... + βnηn + . Using the
categorization described in section 2, our aim is to interpret the principal
components (PCs) with these terms.
One way to determine the quality of care is to write a general factor
model for a pooled model expressed as
X = ΛF + ε, (1)
where Λ is a (p × m) matrix of factor loadings, each λij representing the
loading of the ith variable on the j th factor, F is a (m × 1) vector of com-
mon factors, and ε is a (p× 1) vector of error terms. The idea is to capture
the variation present in p random variables (X) with m  p common fac-
tors (F ). As we want to combine information from a relatively large number
of indicators into a small number of factors, we are interested in the pro-
portion of sample variance contributed by the various factors. We then use
ΛF to produce the principal components that approximate η – the quality
dimensions.
The principal component solution can be obtained either from the sample
covariance matrix or the sample correlation matrix.10 We prefer the correla-
tion matrix over the covariance matrix, because principal components that
are obtained from the covariance matrix are sensitive to the units of mea-
10Since factor analysis is a well-known technique, we omit the presentation for the
solution, which can be found in Johnson and Wichern (2002) or in Jolliffe (2002), among
others.
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surement of the elements of X. In particular, if the indicators are measured
at different scales and have different variances, then those indicators with
largest variances tend to dominate in the first PCs. It is apparent that the
aforementioned facts hold true for our set of indicators, and hence use of the
covariance matrix will be ruled out, leaving us with the correlation matrix.
Fixed effects cost model
In the second stage, we regress primary health care costs on estimated fac-
tors, which provide proxies for the dimensions of quality. We allow for in-
dividual fixed effects to control for other unobserved heterogeneity in the
panel. If the quality of care were not modelled, the fixed effects would also
include the unobserved quality of care.
Let us assume that the cost function is represented by a fixed effects
model
ckt = αk + γ
′ηkt + δ′zkt + ekt, (2)
where ckt are primary health care (operating) costs for municipality k, αk
are unobservable fixed effects other than quality indicators, ηkt are the qual-
ity indicators, zkt are other observable characteristics, and ekt is a random
disturbance term. Our expenditure data reflect variable costs, since capital
expenditure and fixed assets are excluded. Therefore, we approximate the
short-term cost function.
We estimate three different, non-nested versions of the cost model. The
benchmark model does not include any quality indicators, but it is a very
simple cost model including a proxy for the wages, two standard outcomes
and two control variables. In this model, the quality of care is treated as
unobservable and incorporated in the fixed effects estimates. In the second
version, instead of the standard outcomes, the quality component obtained
from the sub-set of data is included in the model. Lastly, in the third version,
quality component(s) from the extended set approximate the outcomes of
10
health care.
Our indicators are expressed in per capita terms, whereby the capital
of Finland (Helsinki) should not drive the results (because of being more
than twice as big as the second largest city, Espoo). Therefore, Model (2)
is also estimated in per capita terms.11 Since the statistical properties of
the generated variables, i.e. PCs, are generally not known, the estimated
standard errors might also be inconsistent.12 To mitigate the effect of this
failure, we present bootstrapped standard errors.
Estimation procedures
Our estimation proceeds as follows. We first estimate the factor model with
27 indicators to identify which of the components the indicators having qual-
ity of care content seem to have greatest impact on. Second, we add other
variables related to health care (but not necessarily to its quality) to explore
whether and how the components of interest react to this additional infor-
mation. This is to say that we add measures of inputs and socio-economic
and demographic variables to data. Then, having defined the dimensions
of the quality of care, we assess their relationship with the costs in a fixed
effects model.
4 Results
Principal component analysis
Model 1a (columns 2 and 3) in Table 1 presents the results from PCA. When
exploring 27 indicators to identify 27 principal components, we find that the
11An additional reason for preferring the linear model is that one should incorporate
interactions and second order terms in the trans-log cost function. In the presence of
principal components this is not feasible, as they are orthogonal. Furthermore, the higher
order polynomials of PCs might not necessarily have any meaningful interpretation. How-
ever, we acknowledge that estimating the cost model in per capita terms in effect imposes
linear homogeneity.
12Pagan (1984) evaluated the econometric problems of using generated variables in a
regression equation.
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first 8 of the components explain two-thirds of the total sample variance. In
addition, the rate of decrease in the explanatory fraction is rather rapid, as
the first component explains 30%, the second 9% and the eight PC less than
4% of the variance.
Model (1a)
Component Proportion, % Cumulative prop., %
pc1 29.6 29.6
pc2 9.0 38.6
pc3 7.8 46.4
pc4 5.5 51.9
pc5 4.6 56.5
pc6 4.3 60.8
pc7 4.0 64.8
pc8 3.6 68.4
Table 1: Principal component analysis, N=2574
In order to interpret the PCs, one needs to evaluate the factor loadings.
We are keen to determine which dimensions of quality (if any) are present in
the PCs. Through the construction of the PC method, the first component
captures most of the total sample variance, and hence it is of a natural focus
of interest which variables obtain the highest loadings on it. Table 2 presents
the highest factor loadings in absolute terms (the cut-off being ±0.15)13.
Three types of variables have high factor loadings on the first principal
component (PC1). Firstly, the first PC has high factor loadings on the stan-
dard outputs of health care, i.e. hospital care and inpatient health care,
which reflect the availability/accessibility of health care. Second, the preva-
lence of sickness in the population is well represented, as those entitled to
special refunds on medicines and the number of disability pension recipients
also have high factor loadings. Almost the entire population is represented
here, as different age and disease groups are present in first PC, i.e., all age
groups are equally served. As already discussed in section 2, since the en-
13According to Jolliffe (2002), no test for statistical significance exists. One plausible
criterion is to report coefficients whose absolute value is greater than half of the maximum
coefficient, i.e. 0.313/2.
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titlement decision is based on the severity of the disease on the basis of a
certificate issued by a specialist, the entitlement indicator reflects, from one
point of view, the prevalence of severe (or long-term) diseases in the pop-
ulation, but also, from another point of view, the ability of the system to
pinpoint those who are in need of a special refund status and medication.14
Lastly, the two measures of the use of private care seem to be important
variables in determining the first PC. Clearly, those who are less satisfied
with public care, less inclined to wait to be served, or living in areas where
public care availability is limited, opt to use the private health care partly
at their own expense (willingness to pay).
Factor
Variable loading
Entitled to special refunds on medicines (ESRM), as % of aged 40-64 0.313
Inpatient primary health care, patients per 1000 inhabitants 0.287
ESRM: coronary heart disease, as % of aged 65 and over 0.276
Entitled to special refunds on medicines, as % of aged 25-39 0.275
Disability pension recipients: mental ..., as % of aged 16-64 0.274
Hospital care, patients per 1000 inhabitants 0.270
ESRM: asthma, as % of aged 65 and over 0.229
ESRM: psychosis, as % of aged 65 and over 0.224
ESRM: diabetes, as % of aged 65 and over 0.213
ESRM: hypertension, as % of aged 65 and over 0.212
Inpatient primary health care, care days per 1000 inhabitants 0.212
Visits in private dental care per 1000 inhabitants -0.248
Reimbursement for visits to private physicians, recipients as % of t.p. -0.258
Table 2: Factor loadings on the first principal component for Model (1a)
Next, we bring the resource and control variables under scrutinization,
i.e. we add 24 extra variables to the data set. Given that we now have 51
variables present in data, the first PC appears to account for a reasonable
14One can speculate that if the system were of high quality, i.e. if all people in need of
special reimbursement entitlement also received it, the variation between areas would not
indicate differences in the quality of the system, but rather differences in the prevalence of a
particular health problem. However, while this can hold true for some diseases, it certainly
does not hold true for all of them. Most of diseases are such that their prevalence should
be uniformly (age and sex adjustably) distributed between areas. Then, the differences
between areas would reflect differences in the quality of care.
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amount of variance, as it explains 20% of the total sample variance, while
11% of the sample variance is explained by the second PC (Table 11 in Ap-
pendix B). Nevertheless, adding more variables also introduces more ’noise’
to data, whereby it is not necessary that all first PCs are closely related to
(the quality of) health care.
Model (1b) Factor
Variable loading
Entitled to special refunds on medicines (ESRM), as % of aged 40-64 0.271
Inpatient primary health care, patients per 1000 inhabitants 0.263
Hospital care, patients per 1000 inhabitants 0.254
Disability pension recipients: mental ..., as % of aged 16-64 0.250
Entitled to special refunds on medicines, as % of aged 25-39 0.241
ESRM: coronary heart disease, as % of aged 65 and over 0.225
ESRM: psychosis, as % of aged 65 and over 0.203
ESRM: diabetes, as % of aged 65 and over 0.191
Population aged 65 and over as % of total population 0.181
Population aged 15-64 as % of total population -0.183
Tax revenue, euros per capita -0.210
Visits in private dental care per 1000 inhabitants -0.210
Reimbursement for visits to private physicians, recipients as % of t.p. -0.224
Table 3: Factor loadings on the first principal component for Model (1b)
To further asses the information content of the first PCs of Model (1a)
and Model (1b), we compare them against each other. Evaluating the highest
factor loadings of the first PC reveals that irrespective of the additional data,
same variables seem to rank highly in forming the first PCs, as 10 out of
13 variables are the same as in Model (1a).15 However, some differences
appear as are emphasized in Table 3. A particularly interesting change
is the appearance of demographics-related control variables in the set of
variables that load the first PC (i.e. the share of working-aged in the total
population and the share of retired in the total population). The presence
15If one were to use 0.14 as a cut-off, the list of interesting variables would include six
extra variables (sign): population aged 65 and over (+), inpatient primary health care, care
days per 1000 inhabitants (+), entitled to special refunds on medicines for hypertension
(+) and on medicines for asthma (+), unemployment rate (+), and children aged 1-6 yrs
in municipally funded day care (-). More detailed results are available from the authors
upon request.
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of the share of the working-aged is accompanied by tax revenue, as together
they drive a municipality’s budget. Second, most employees are entitled to
occupational health care, whereby a high share of workforce and employment
in particular will lower the demand for public health care. When retiring, the
entitlement naturally vanishes, whereby the share of elderly in the population
is positively related to the use of public care.
Irrespective of these interesting changes, our results for the first PC seem
relatively robust. This is verified by the fact that PC1 of Model (1b) and
PC1 of Model (1a) are very highly correlated (98), which suggests that they
share exactly the same information content. Then, although typically with
PCA less is more in terms of the number of variables, we prefer Model (1b)
over Model (1a), as we are interested in different dimensions of the quality of
care.16 Hence, we concentrate on the PCs of Model (1b) in the subsequent
analysis.
To summarize our findings thus far, it appears that in the first principal
component the key determinants have a tight relationship with a quality that
is attributed to the accessibility of public health care. Nevertheless, while
the first component carries information on the equal accessibility of public
health care, it also suggests that some patients opt out from the system
either due to quality deficiencies or congestion.
The interpretation of subsequent components builds on the fact that each
PC adds new information to the previous ones, since the PCs are orthogonal.
In other words, if the first component measures the quality through accessi-
bility, as seems to be the case, the subsequent components should measure
other aspects of quality. Since not all of the 51 components are relevant, we
concentrate on those components capturing the majority of the variation, i.e.
components 1–4, which also are components that capture interesting quality
16The results presented by Bai and Ng (2002) suggest that the number of variables to
construct the factor need not be extremely large for the principal components approach
to yield precise estimates. Thus, the number of indicator variables in our analysis could
be smaller.
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attributes (See Appendix B, Tables 11–13).
With regards to the second component, it appears that the 12 highest
ranking variables are all health care inputs and signal the importance of the
coverage of health care. The thirteenth variable is a measure of entitlement
to special refunds on diabetes medicines in the cohort aged 65 years and
over, but it is less important than the others by a large margin. Therefore,
it is clear that the second PC measures the input mix and the coverage of
care.17 Here we take an approach that greater coverage is an indication of
greater quality. The third component, on the other hand, has high loadings
on different measures of services that are closely associated with primary
care, in particular on those social services geared to children and youths.
Therefore, the third PC can be interpreted as a need for social assistance,
and reflects risk adjustment. An implication is that the third PC includes
no information on the quality of the health care per se.
Lastly, as the interpretation of the fourth PC is less clear, and the amount
of variation it captures is also only 6% of the total sample variance, this is
the final component we interpret. Firstly, the two demographic extremes
are present in this component. The share of children and youths is present
with a positive sign, while the share of elderly people is manifested with a
negative sign. Second, the services geared to the elderly seem to dominate
the fourth component, as there are several such indicators present in it.
Their presence signals the extent of the service portfolio and the quality
of care for the elderly (support for informal care, inpatient care days and
mortality). In particular, the two extremes of intensity of care are present:
informal care at home, where care is given by family members, relatives or
friends, and inpatient care days in hospitals, with the elderly having the
majority of care days. Since the two extremes for the intensity of care and
for the age structure are present in the fourth component, it therefore reflects
17One could speculate whether the suggested input mix is optimal. This question,
however, is out the scope of this paper.
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care geared to the elderly, and the quality of municipalities’ overall portfolio
design in particular. For the sake of simplicity, we name this component
allocative efficiency.
To summarize, our results indicate that the quality of care has three dif-
ferent quality dimensions: first, the (equal) accessibility of public health care;
second, the coverage of public health care, and finally, the age-related/portfolio
quality of care, i.e. allocative efficiency for short. The third PC seems to
reflect risk adjustment and is not a signal of quality.
We perform a further check to evaluate the robustness of the above find-
ings.18 We exclude the entitlement indicators from the data and build our
analysis on data typically available to researchers. To simplify the compar-
isons, we only report the subsequent changes in the first four PCs as they
appear, while more details are available from the authors upon request. The
first three PCs experience minor changes and they are all highly correlated
with the original PCs, the pairwise correlations being over 90 for respective
pairs. The greatest number of changes appears in the fourth component,
although the original and the robust PC are highly correlated (67.8). Since
the entitlement indicators are not present in the data, none of the ’robust’
PCs can include any of them, but all other key indicators from Model (1b)
are present.
The new variables present in the ’robust’ PC1 all measure accessibility.19
Clearly, they capture roughly the same information as the entitlement indi-
cators, as manifested in the high correlation coefficient of the PCs. Virtually
no change appears in the second PC, as the input variables also dominate
the ’robust’ PC2. This holds true with the third component as well, where
only one new variable appears in the ’robust’ PC.20 The majority of changes
18One obvious robustness check is to include the costs of care in the data and redo the
PCA. As first components of Model (1b) were not influenced by this change, the results
are not reported here.
19Presented in order of importance, the variables are: Inpatient primary health care
days; Unemployment rate; Dental care patients in health centres; Children aged 1-6 in
municipally funded day care and Outpatient physician visits in primary health care.
20Disability pension for mental and behavioural disorders recipients displaces Outpatient
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appear in the fourth component, as in the absence of entitlement data, in-
dicators of socio-economic and demographic characteristics appear in the
’robust’ PC4.21 To summarize, perhaps with the exception of the fourth
PC, the PCs are relatively robust to the exclusion of entitlement indicators.
The majority of changes appear in the sense of a polarization, whereby the
remaining key indicators gain more weight in forming the ’robust’ PCs, while
the other indicators become less meaningful.
Fixed effects cost model
A second stage is to evaluate the usefulness of the above findings and to
examine the relationship between the quality of care dimensions and the
costs of care. To this end we perform three straightforward regressions.
As our benchmark regression (Model 2’), and to facilitate comparison, we
regress the costs of primary health care on standard outputs (morbidity
index, number of outpatient visits) and control variables (offenses against
life and health, support for informal care). We then regress the costs of care
on the PC1 of Model (1a) and on same controls as in our benchmark model.
Lastly, we replace the outputs and controls with the first four PCs of Model
(1b) and redo the analysis. The models also include approximated wages22, a
constant and a linear trend. Only those municipalities are included where we
have an adequate number of observations to perform a meaningful analysis.
The estimation results are presented in Table 5.23
visits in specialized health care.
21What exactly happens with the fourth PC is that it becomes more polarized in the
sense that a few key indicators dominate it, while the rest have little weight on the PC. The
dominant variables are those present in PC4 of Model (1b) accompanied by Outpatient
visits in specialized health care, Social assistance recipients and Population aged 15-64 as
% of total population.
22Wage data are available from 2008 onwards, while we approximate the wages for
2000–2007 by using the price index of public expenditure.
23Acknowledging Newhouse’s (1987) discussion on raw data versus log transformation,
we also estimated Model (2b) with log cost, but this resulted in only minor changes in
the results. After log transformation, coverage would also be statistically significantly,
although negatively, related to costs. Furthermore, including PC2 in the cost model is
perhaps a little unconventional, since it reflects the input mix, but we are testing the value
added of our analysis rather than seeking the best cost model.
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Model Model Model
Variables (2’) (2a) (2b)
PC1 of Model (1a) − 4.66
(.753)
−
PC1 of Model (1b) − − 5.08
(.701)
PC2 of Model (1b) − − .497
(.439)
PC3 of Model (1b) − − 1.21
(.383)
PC4 of Model (1b) − − −.829
(.444)
Wage 346.4
(90.9)
305.6
(88.1)
249.5
(95.7)
Control Variables
Morbidity index −1.06
(.723)
− −
Outpatient physician visits .005
(.005)
− −
Offenses against life and health .270
(.884)
.676
(.886)
−
Support for informal care 2.13
(1.50)
−.479
(1.30)
−
c 370.5
(46.6)
115.9
(36.30)
−23.8
(52.2)
trend 26.8
(.783)
25.9
(.772)
27.6
(1.28)
N 1522 1522 1522
Groups 246 246 246
R-squared 0.18 0.60 0.67
Table 4: Estimation results. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
(Models 2’–2b ).
Let us first consider Model (2’) as a starting point for our analysis. None
of the standard outputs or controls is statistically significant, not even mor-
bidity index. In this model, costs are only explained by wages, a constant and
a trend. The model is under-identified and probably yields biased results.
Incorporating the first PC in the model (Model 2a) changes the results.24
Namely, while neither of the control variables are statistically significant, the
first PC is. This finding suggests that in summarizing the information on
24The Hausman specification test suggests that, compared with a random effects model,
a fixed effects model is an appropriate model specification. In addition, when we estimated
a two-way fixed effects model, that is, included the year dummies instead of a time trend,
the dummies seemed to pick a linear trend. Hence, to avoid unnecessary complications,
we prefer to present the results yielded by a standard fixed effects model with a linear
trend instead of a two-way fixed effects model.
19
care, performing PCA was meaningful.
In Model (2b), which is the quality-adjusted cost function the first prin-
cipal component, the accessibility of care, is positively related to the costs
of care, i.e. high costs and high accessibility seem to go hand in hand. Sec-
ond, the coverage quality (PC2) is not related to costs. Given that coverage
reflects inputs and we already have wages in the model, this finding is as
expected. Third, the risk adjustment (PC3) is positively related to costs,
while the portfolio and care geared to the elderly (PC4) is negatively related
to costs.
Since all PCs are measured with the same range, that is, as an index from
0 to 100, it is easy to compare the estimates with each other. The largest
savings could be achieved by reducing the accessibility of care, while cost
savings could also be achieved by more efficient allocation of resources in
the care for the elderly. In particular, as long as informal care and inpatient
care are substitutes, allocating more resources to informal care and less to
institutional care makes sense. However, if these savings come from keeping
elderly patients in informal care when they should be receiving more inten-
sive, institutional care, then such cost savings are simply a cost reallocation
from the present to the future and make no sense. There is room for savings
only over- or misuse of intensive care are occurring.
Since the models are not nested, it is difficult to evaluate how much value
added the PCs really had in terms of evaluating inefficiency.25 One way to
evaluate this is to produce the fixed effects from all three models. In the
benchmark model, the fixed effects estimate should include the latent quality,
while its influence is deducted from fixed effects of Models (2a) and (2b) in
particular. Therefore, since the fixed effects are not directly comparable,
we rank the municipalities according to them and then compare the deciles.
25While comparison of the models that are non-nested is not feasible with standard
tests, we estimated a larger model including all variables from Models (2b) and (2’) with
the exception of the morbidity index, which was excluded due to its high correlation with
PC1. These results confirm that Model (2b) is closer to the true model than Model (2’).
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It appears that 78% of the municipalities shift from one decile to another
when comparing the fixed effects produced by Model (2’) to those of Model
(2b). Some municipalities experience rather strong transitions, as is the case
for Espoo (the second largest city) for example, which swings from the first
decile (i.e. the most efficient) to the seventh decile after quality is accounted
for. Changes are less radical when comparing Model (2b) with Model (2a),
as half of the municipalities remain in their original decile and the biggest
leaps and lapses are by 3 deciles. Nevertheless, using only the first PC is not
enough to yield correct inferences regarding inefficiency.
To summarize, the results from Model (2b) indicate that using PCA
to reduce the dimensionality when producing the quality components offers
important insights into the relationship between the quality of care and its
costs. Furthermore, if the variation in the information we interpret as quality
is not controlled for, the efficiency estimates yield biased results, whereby
some municipalities are displaced to the wrong group. From a policymaker’s
point of view, such shortcomings can be dangerous and lead to erroneous,
potentially even harmful decisions.
5 Discussion
We aggregated information from various macro-level indicators of health
care by means of factor analysis, effectively producing three quality of care
indicators. We then regressed costs on the estimated factors and examined
the relationship of accessibility, coverage and allocative efficiency with the
costs. The relationship between costs and quality is more complex than
previously thought: increases in accessibility can only be achieved together
with increases in costs, while increases in allocative efficiency may potentially
lead to reduced costs.
Our results clearly point out the importance and relevance of PCA when
extracting information from macro-level indicators. Scrutinization of the first
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principal component suggests that the most important dimension of quality
is the accessibility of care. Such an outcome is hardly surprising, as equal
accessibility is perhaps the most important aspect of the quality of care, and
the underlying reason for the publicly provided and funded health care in
the first place. Therefore, we take it as a positive signal that different age
and disease groups are equally represented in the first PC.
What policy implications do our results offer? From the policymakers’
point of view, it is a telling sign that indicators of the use of private care are
also present in the first component. It appears that people opt out of public
care because of quality deficiencies or due to congestion or the inexistence
of the public provision. Furthermore, its relationship with costs is positive,
with better accessibility of care being reflected in higher costs. Our results
also suggest that it is worth paying attention to the inputs in health care,
although their relationship with the costs of care remains ambiguous. Lastly,
our results indicate that by enhancing allocative efficiency, municipalities
are able to achieve some cost savings. It also is a signal that the service
portfolio will become easily dominated by those services that are geared
towards the elderly. As the Finnish population is rapidly aging and the age-
related demand for care is set to rise in the coming years, this is a weak
signal of the age-related pressure on costs.
The results of the study are also applicable to other countries than Fin-
land, as policymakers will need tools to tackle the increasing demand for
health care and pressure on costs. The current paper facilitates the task
by providing the audience with information on the indicators that should
be concentrated on when evaluating the outcome of the health care system
with the aim of hindering unnecessary cost increases. Finally, the issues
addressed in this paper are not unique to health care, but similar problems
arise in other (public) services. Our approach to address the problem is
applicable to other fields as long as indicator data exist.
While our results are potentially very useful for those who wish to sum-
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marize information from various indicators to produce aa quality indicator,
or any other, a caveat is in place. At the system level, very few indicators
can be attributed as direct quality indicators, whereby the principal com-
ponents (PCs) constructed from aggregate macro-level indicators are not as
intimately tied to quality as one might want. In our case, instead of accessi-
bility, coverage or allocative efficiency, one can derive other interpretations
for these components, such as demand, supply and so on. Irrespective of
whether one wishes to label the indicator as accessibility or, say, demand,
it is important that these indicators effectively summarize information from
various indicators, making the estimation of the cost model more efficient,
as also shown in our results.
One avenue of future research could be an evaluation of the various in-
dicators of health care with more disaggregated data. Moreover, if the data
were available, variables that are more directly controlled by decision makers,
such as preventive policies, would also be worth investigating. Such analysis
would have important implications for economic policy-making.
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A Appendix: data
Tables 5–7 list the variables used to estimate the static factor. The variables
are categorized according to their relationship with quality, that is, whether
they measure quality directly (D) or indirectly (I). The latter are further
categorized as measures for accessibility (A) and coverage (C) or risk ad-
justment (R). Those variables that are more loosely related to quality are
either demographic controls (DC) or budget controls (BC). The source of the
data is SOTKAnet, unless otherwise indicated. The number in parentheses
specifies the ID code used in SOTKAnet.
Quality measures Form
Disability pension: mental and behavioural disorders, as % of aged 16-64 (3218) D
Outpatient physician visits in primary health care, per 1000 inhabitants (1552) A/I
Outpatient visits in specialised health care, per 1000 inhabitants (1560) A/I
Patients seen by a physician in primary health care, as % of tot. pop. (3224) A/I
Dentist visits in health centres, per 1000 inhabitants (2397) A/I
Inpatient primary health care, care days per 1000 inhabitants (1267) A/I
Hospital care, patients per 1000 inhabitants (1256) A/I
Inpatient primary health care, patients per 1000 inhabitants (1268) A/I
Dental care patients in health centres, patients per 1000 inhabitants (1559) A/I
Psychiatric inpatient care, care days per 1000 inhabitants (id:1263) A/I
Diseases related to substance abuse: periods of care, as % of aged 15-24 (1279) R
Entitled to special refunds on medicines (ESRM), as % of aged 0-15 (230) A/I
Entitled to special refunds on medicines (ESRM), as % of aged 16-24 (231) A/I
Entitled to special refunds on medicines (ESRM), as % of aged 25-39 (1809) A/I
Entitled to special refunds on medicines (ESRM), as % of aged 40-64 (1810) A/I
ESRM for psychosis, as % of aged 65 and over (408) A/I
ESRM for diabetes, as % of aged 65 and over (1803) A/I
ESRM for asthma, as % of aged 65 and over (1808) A/I
ESRM for coronary heart disease, as % of aged 65 and over (1822) A/I
ESRM for hypertension, as % of aged 65 and over (1821) A/I
Service housing with 24-hour assistance, as % of aged 65 and over (1252) D
Support for informal care: clients, as % of aged 75 and over (3262) D
Living at home, as % of aged 75 and over (1570) D
Household dwelling-units with one person, as % of aged 75 and over (2451) R
Reimbursement for visits to private physicians, recipients as % of tot. pop. (692) D
Visits in private dental care per 1000 inhabitants (3217) D
Mortality among population aged 65 and over, as % of persons of same age (322) D
Table 5: Variables used to estimate the static factor: Quality measures
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Inputs (per 10 000 inhabitants) Form
Dental assistants in primary health care (2623) C/I
Dental hygienists in primary health care (2622) C/I
Dentists in primary health care (2621) C/I
Practical nurses in specialised health care (2644) C/I
Practical nurses in primary health care (2638) C/I
Physicians in primary health care (2635) C/I
Assistant nurses in primary health care (2639) C/I
Nurses in primary health care (2636) C/I
Public health nurses in primary health care (2637) C/I
Ward sisters in primary health care (3306) C/I
Physiotherapists in primary health care (3307) C/I
Radiographers in primary health care (3308) C/I
Medical laboratory technologists in primary health care (3309) C/I
Table 6: Variables used to estimate the static factor: Inputs & Coverage
B Appendix: results
Tables 8–11 present results for Model (1b).
Tables 9–11 present the highest factor loadings for PCs 2–4.
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Controls Form
Morbidity index, age standardised (184) -
Long-term unemployed, as % of unemployed population (326) R
Unemployment rate, as % of labour force (181) R
Offenses against life and health recorded by the police, as % of tot. pop. (3113) R
Social assistance, recipient persons during year, as % of tot. pop. (493) R
Support in community care: a child welfare intervention, as % of aged 0-17 (1245) R
Children aged 1-6 in municipally funded day care, as % of aged 1-6 (2955) D
Population aged 0-14 as % of total population (1064) DC
Population aged 15-64 as % of total population (1067) DC
Population aged 65 and over as % of total population (1068) DC
Loans, euros per capita (3180) BC
Tax revenue, euros per capita (3177) BC
Costs
Net expenditure of the municipal health sector, euros per capita (1291) -
Net expenditure on primary health care (including dental care), euros p.c. (1072) -
Wage cost data (Source: Statistics Finland) -
The price index of public expenditure (Source: Statistics Finland)
Table 7: Control and cost variables
Model (1b)
Component Proportion, % Cumulative prop., %
pc1 20.2 20.2
pc2 10.9 31.1
pc3 6.8 37.9
pc4 5.6 43.5
pc5 4.3 47.8
pc6 3.2 51.0
pc7 2.9 53.9
pc8 2.8 56.7
Table 8: Principal component analysis for Model (1b), N=1595
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Model (1b) Factor
Variable loading
Nurses in primary health care 0.362
Assistant nurses in primary health care 0.331
Practical nurses in primary health care 0.326
Public health nurses in primary health care 0.303
Dental assistants in primary health care 0.284
Physiotherapists in primary health care 0.278
Ward sisters in primary health care 0.276
Physicians in primary health care 0.272
Radiographers in primary health care 0.241
Dentists in primary health care 0.236
Medical laboratory technologists in primary health care 0.227
Dental hygienists in primary health care 0.152
ESRM for diabetes, as % of aged 65 and over 0.083
Table 9: Estimation results for Model (1b), second component
Model (1b) Factor
Variable loading
Offenses against life and health recorded by the police 0.367
Social assistance, recipient persons as % of total population 0.269
Population aged 15-64 as % of total population 0.263
Support in community care as part of a child welfare intervention 0.258
Household dwelling-units with one person, as % of aged 75 and over 0.246
Psychiatric inpatient care, care days per 1000 inhabitants 0.236
Tax revenue, euros per capita 0.232
Outpatient visits in specialised health care per 1000 inhabitants 0.194
Diseases related to substance abuse: periods of care, as % of aged 15-24 0.176
Unemployment rate 0.155
Population aged 0-14 as % of total population -0.204
Dental care patients in health centres per 1000 inhabitants -0.262
Dentist visits in health centres per 1000 inhabitants -0.323
Table 10: Estimation results for Model (1b), third component
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Model (1b) Factor
Variable loading
Population aged 0-14 as % of total population 0.392
ESRM: asthma, as % of aged 65 and over 0.272
ESRM: coronary heart disease, as % of aged 65 and over 0.230
Support for informal care: clients, as % of aged 75 and over 0.225
Loans, euros per capita 0.221
ESRM: hypertension, as % of aged 65 and over 0.209
ESRM: diabetes, as % of aged 65 and over 0.206
Mortality among population aged 65 and over, as % of persons of same age -0.154
Outpatient physician visits in primary health care per 1000 inhabitants -0.180
Patients seen by a physician in primary health care as % of tot. pop. -0.184
Household dwelling-units with one person, as % of aged 75 and over -0.186
Inpatient primary health care, care days per 1000 inhabitants -0.202
Population aged 65 and over as % of total population -0.345
Table 11: Estimation results for Model (1b), fourth component
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